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Abstract 
Gossip based communication is an efficient tool to manage unstructured decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay 
connectivity. Such unstructured overlay connectivity is prone to security risks. Few malicious nodes are able to isolate all 
peer of the entire overlay as in Hub attack. Several existing security protocols such as SPSS, TooLate, and S-Gossip have 
dealt with this Hub attack. A probabilistic gossip-based secure protocol is introduced to handle this attack efficiently. It 
senses faulty neighbours before gossip with high probability. It uses a single control table to seize the malicious nodes. 
The comparison shows that the effects of the proposed security protocol are better than others. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of the Internet in terms of size, services and speed indicates the changes from traditional 
client-server model to P2P model. In client-server model, clients can only request services and server can 
provide the response of the client requests. If server fails then whole system will be down. It indicates a single 
point of failure. To overcome such problems, distributed P2P architecture has been proposed. In this 
architecture, each peer (or node) seems as a server and communicate without participating of any central 
server. This architecture implements an abstract logical overlay over application layer. 
Peer-to-Peer system categorized into two types: Structured and Unstructured. Structured P2P has fixed 
overlay network topology such as ring and hypercube.  Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is responsible to 
construct such well-structured overlay and is support to perform an exhaustive and exact search1. Unlike 
Structured P2P, Unstructured P2P does not have any structure. Gossip-based protocols2,3  have come as 
popular paradigm for pure unstructured P2P systems. It forms a dynamic structure and follows small world 
network. Gossip-based protocols can easily construct such dynamic structure with the help of few neighbors4, 
5. These few neighbors refer as view of a node. This view is updated with the help of gossiping peers at each 
gossip. This small set of view provides the vision of entire overlay9, 10. The vision of a peer will be deemed if 
the view set reduces its size. The reduction of a view may naturally (by churn) or forceful (by malicious 
peers). Natural reduction of view can be handled by gossip protocols efficiently. It shows that it can maintain 
the connectivity even after at a time 70\% peers left the overlay6, 7, 8.  On the other hand, the protocol cannot 
suffer few malicious nodes. These malicious nodes can enter to show a new update for good nodes.  The 
malicious nodes will leave the overlay after polluting the entire view of each node. It isolates all peers and 
described in Hub attack12. Hence, security while gossip is a major issue in unstructured P2P overlays.  
 2016 The uthors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the ICISP2015
596   Anubhava Srivastava and Parvez Ahmad /  Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  595 – 602 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is presented in Section II. Section III presents 
the proposed secure probabilistic gossip-based mechanism. Its comparative security results are presented in 
Section IV. Finally, in Section V we present the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Related Work 
To reduce the effect of Hub attack, some security protocols such as SPSS11, TooLate12 and S-Gossip13 have 
come into picture. SPSS focuses that a high in-degree node is more likely to become a hub, so malicious. The 
central authority keeps on watching every nodes, determines threshold and compare to maintain lists, namely, 
(i) blacklist, and (ii) whitelist. Higher in-degree nodes than threshold are maintained in blacklist whereas 
others in whitelist. Gossiping is ensured between two peers under the supervision of central authority. There 
is high probability that the malicious nodes can pollute the cache or view before determining whether it is 
affected peer or unaffected and central authority may be failed. Therefore, SPSS cannot provide integrated 
security feature so to overcome this issue, TooLate came into existence. TooLate as being completely 
decentralized can tightly handle blacklist with the base gossip protocol. 
There are some other research works such as Uniform and Ergodic Sampling14 and Brahms15 are also 
mentioned about the effects of malicious nodes. Recently, S-Gossip has come into existence to reduce the 
effect of Hub attack with elimination of multiple instances of TooLate protocol. In S-Gossip protocol, Every 
peers has three tables namely  Genuine Table, Suspicious Table and Malicious Table which creates three level 
of filtering of peers to ban or prevent malicious peers to include with non-affected peers, Malicious nodes are 
identified by using trust information by each peers about other peers and restricted them. This is more 
efficient than TooLate from the view point of security. 
It is single instance protocol unlike TooLate protocol. There is no central authority as in SPSS. For 
capturing malicious nodes, it uses three tables namely Genuine Table, Suspicious Table and Malicious Table. 
The execution of each gossip results in update of each table. Genuine table has node ID, Suspicious Count 
and TTL values of a node. Suspicious table maintains node ID and Malicious Count only. On the other hand, 
Malicious table contains node ID and TTL values of each peer. All three tables are maintained unique node 
IDs, i.e., the intersection of the tables give null set of peer. After each gossip, the table thresholds are verified 
and the victim entries are forced to shift into their respective table.  
The propose research work is based on a probabilistic gossip-based protocol. The property of sensing 
malicious nodes, before gossip, makes it different from others. Other distinguishes properties are, (i) it has 
completely decentralize mechanism unlike SPSS, (ii) it reduces number of tables unlike multiple tables in 
TooLate and S-Gossip, (iii) it reduces communication overhead unlike multiple instances of TooLate. 
 
3. Probabilistic Gossip-based Model 
A robust epidemic gossip technique has been proposed to reduce the degree of communication overhead. It 
has managed by view table VTable and control table VTable. Both tables are used to detect and paralyze some 
malicious nodes at the optimum level at each node. Primarily, VTable is assigned for maintaining small set of 
neighbor peers list and CTable for preventing from malicious peers. VTable contains neighbors (or view) of a 
node as in traditional gossip protocols such as Cyclon, Newscast, etc. The table assigns a predefine length and 
refers as View Length. It means the table contains up to View Length neighbors. The nodes inside table 
maintains two descriptors, they are node ID and capacity distribution index (CDI). The CDI value is used to 
enhance peer exchange operation to perform gossiping between two peers. 
The value is computed for each adjacent peer on the basis of neighbor’s capacity and in-degree. In general, 
each peer prefers to connect a high capacity neighbors peer for better service. But, the availability of the 
service is also a challenging issue in gossip protocols. Hence, we consider in-degree of VTable peers while 
selecting a peer to gossip with. High in-degree peers are most probably suspected as malicious one. On the 
other hand, low in-degree indicates unavailability of services. 
Therefore, we have taken a probabilistic approach to find out a most suitable candidate for gossip. Let 
probability Pi of a nodei is connected by a new incoming peer. The probability is directly proportional to its 
capacity and inversely proportional to its current in-degree in a non-linear manner controlled by α >0 and β 
>0.  
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Where: 
x ηi= capacity of nodei,  
x ki=  number of P2P connection that a nodeihas 
x L(t)= the set of all live node in VTable. 
 
The larger the value of CDI, the greater chance of that node to be connected in the network according to 
given network structure and condition by tuning the value of αand β. So the gossip network structure designed 
in such way that it is more resilient to peer dynamics and supports efficient search with the help of VTable. 
3.1. Gossip Mechanism  
This protocol as being semantic based, each peers contains some local information (e.g.,CDI) of its 
neighbour peers computed with the help of equation (1). The gossip initialises from a node, say P with 
decrementing TTL by one of each node entry in CTable. Maximum CDI valued node, say Q is selected from 
P's VTable for gossip. In this gossip, nodeP is called an initiator node and performs as active gossip. The 
following steps demonstrate the gossip process at initiator. 
 
Active Gossip at node P: 
x Find CID׊ (VTable.nodei). 
x Decrement TTL value ׊ (CTable.nodei) by 1. 
x Select a max CID value node, say Q. 
x Select random (ViewLength/2)-1 nodes from VTable. 
x Add own node id P with CID=0 to the selected list. 
x Send the list to node Q. 
x Receive a list from node Q. 
x Invoke VTable_update with the help of received list from node Q. 
 
After receiving the peers from node P, node Q performs as a passive gossip. Unlike initiator, passive 
nodeQ does not send own node descriptor. It only sends up to (ViewLength/2) nodes from its VTable. The 
passive gossip process is described below. 
Passive Gossip at node Q: 
x Receive a node list from node P. 
x Select random ViewLength/2 nodes from VTable 
x Send to node P. 
x Invoke VTable_update with the help of received list from node P. 
 
At the end, both nodes update their respective VTable with the received nodes. The updated VTables of 
both end are ensure that the connection link must be followed in reverse direction. Hence at each gossip, the 
connectivity among peers is always maintained. 
3.2. View Table Update  
View table ensures the overlay connectivity. Hence, it is essential to update the entries with latest peer set. 
The malicious entries are able to deem the vision of a peer. Therefore, the proposed probabilistic protocol 
updates and fills each VTable securely with its maximum strength. The update process occurs at two phases. 
First phase called front update, where peers are updated with the receiving peers from the gossiping node. The 
overall processes of this phase are mentioned in algorithm (1). 
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ALGORITHM 1: (VTABLE UPDATE) 
FOREVER DO 
      IF ( NODE € VTABLE)&&(NODE ₡ CTABLE) THEN 
             NODE.HIT = µ CTABLE;  
             NODE.TTL = VIEW  LENGTH; 
             CTABLE  <- NODE; 
      END 
      ELSE IF (NODE € VTABLE)&& (NODE € CTABLE ) THEN 
                    CTABLE.NODE.HIT++; 
      END 
      ELSE IF (NODE ₡ VTABLE)&& (NODE € CTABLE ) THEN 
                    CTABLE.NODE.HIT++; 
                    CTABLE.NODE.TTL = VIEWLENGTH; 
      END 
      ELSE 
                    VTABLE<- NODE ; 
      END 
      INVOKE CTABLE _ UPDATE; 
END 
 
The next phase of VTable update is started at the end of gossip and called back update. In this phase, the 
empty space of VTable is checked. If the size of (|VTable| <ViewLength) then it will check the CTable entries. 
If there is no entry inside CTable, then nothing can be done. It shows that the overlay is just created or the 
node is just joined. In such case, the mechanism waits some time and then checksCTable entries again. Those 
nodes have hit value less than (μ - σ) are eligible peer for coping from CTable to VTable. Other peers are 
treated as either suspicious or malicious; therefore these nodes cannot be copied inside VTable. 
 
 
3.3    ControlTable Update 
 
 
The control table CTable of each peer is updated while each gossip. The CTable has anode descriptor, 
which includes NodeId, hit and TTL value. The detection of malicious nodes is exercised by comparing 
the hit value of the peer with an assigned threshold. The threshold value is the summation of current 
updated mean µ and standard deviation σ of hit values present in the CTable. The µ   and σ are computed 
from equation 1 and 2 respectively, where N is the size of control table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hit threshold is always (µ+σ) for malicious nodes and (µ-σ) for non-malicious nodes. Initially, the 
TTL values of each peer are set to the value of ViewLength. It decrements by one at each gossip. TTL 
value helps to reduced false +ve and false -ve for control table. 
ALGORITHM 2: (CTABLE UPDATE) 
FOREVER DO 
      IF ( NODE € CTABLE)&&(NODE.HIT < (μ- σ))&&(NODE.TTL = 0)  THEN 
             DELETE(CTABLE.NODE); 
 
      END 
      ELSE IF ( NODE € CTABLE)&&(NODE.HIT ≥  (μ+ σ))&&(NODE.TTL = 0)  THEN 
                    CTABLE.NODE.TTL = VIEWLENGTH; 
      END 
      ELSE  
                    CTABLE.NODE.TTL--; 
                    CTABLE.NODE.HIT++; 
      END 
END 
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CTable update process is summarized in algorithm2.Anodeispurged from CTable whenever its TTL 
value will become zero and its hit value less than (µ-σ). Those nodes have hit value more than (µ+σ) will 
be re-initializing its TTL value. This process tries to seize the more gossip tendency nodes inside the 
table and a way from gossip process for time being. For more convenient, the algorithm is illustrated 
with two tables.  The table1 refers the entry and update conditions. A node is entered first time when the 
received node. Say ni, present in VTable but not in CTable.  
In this case, ni is first assigned its hit value equal to the present µ value of CTable. Next, if ni presents only in 
CTable, which reflects that the sender wants more gossip and tries to fill its own VTable entries to the 
receiver end. In such situation the proposed mechanism simply increments the ni's hit value. After some 
gossip, ni easily identifies as malicious when the hit value crossed (µ + σ). Otherwise ni treated as non-
malicious and will release when its TTL becomes 0. This process handles false -ve in our proposed gossip 
mechanism. Fresh entry of ni inside VTable indicates no action on CTable. Table 2 point outs the exit 
conditions of a node from control table. In any case, a node can exit if it spends up to ViewLength gossip. We 
assume that with high probability that a node can be identified malicious or non-malicious inside CTable with 
ViewLength. In this time duration, each node assigns an equal chance to be proved itself. Therefore, the 
proposed mechanism initialize TTL value with ViewLength. The TTL value of each node decrements by one 
at each gossip. When TTL of a node becomes zero in CTable, our mechanism will check its hit value. It 
arises two situation, one for malicious nodes (hit > µ + σ) and second for non-malicious (hit < µ - σ). Former 
situation re-initialize the TTL value while later exit the node from CTable. Re-initialization of TTL value 
gives an opportunity to reduce the false +ve of CTable entries. Removing the entries of CTable helps to make 
a reasonable growth, so that the threshold calculation at each gossip and other overheads will be minimized. 
 
TABLE 1: NODES ENTRY INTO CONTROL TABLE 
RECEIVED NODE Ni ACTION TAKEN 
Ni € VTABLE && Ni ₡ CTABLE HIT = µ CTABLE 
Ni ₡ VTABLE && Ni € CTABLE HIT++ 
Ni ₡ VTABLE && Ni ₡ CTABLE NO ACTION 
 TABLE 2: NODES EXIT FROM CONTROL TABLE 
TTL VALUE HIT VALUE ACTION TAKEN 
= 0 < (µ CTABLE - σCTABLE) PURGE FROM CTABLE 
= 0 > (µ CTABLE + σCTABLE) RE INITIALIZE TTL 
> 0 
OR 
< 0 
> (µ CTABLE +- σCTABLE) 
OR 
< (µ CTABLE - σCTABLE) 
INCREMENT HIT BY 1 
 
 
3.3    Joining and Leaving of node 
 
 
 
 
In the proposed mechanism, each new node selects introducer nodes upto ViewLength. Then, the node 
find CDI value for applying probability formula of equation 1. It selects max CDI value nodes as its 
introducer node. This introducer node sends peers from its VTable and update the receiving new node 
inside its VTable. Further, the normal gossip proceeds. In such gossip, the leaving process is not defined 
and referred as churn rate. It indicates the rate of node joining and leaving in a gossip cycle. Obviously, 
more churn rate gives unsuitability in network connectivity while fewer rates insure healthy connectivity 
among peers. 
 
 
 
600   Anubhava Srivastava and Parvez Ahmad /  Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  595 – 602 
 
4   Results and Analysis 
 
 
Results of the proposed Probabilistic gossip protocol are compared and analysed with the help of Peersim 
[16] simulator. We took S-Gossip and TooLate security protocols to compare our proposed protocol. S-
Gossip is recent security protocols while TooLate security is popular one. For exact comparison, all security 
protocols are securing a well-known unsecured Cyclon [9] gossip protocol from Hub Attack. Our protocol 
beats then with good marginal difference, which is shown in figure 3 and figure 4. Both simulations are 
performed in a large network size, which contains 1,000 nodes. The ViewLength is 20 throughout the 
simulation. We have introduced 2% malicious nodes at simulation cycle one. Although, the effects of 
malicious nodes are independent from its injection cycle. Both results are explained below. Figure 3 describes 
the affect of malicious nodes without taking churn into considering, i.e., the network is static. The affect is 
comparatively less of the proposed mechanism due to probabilistically acknowledgement property of 
malicious nodes to non-malicious nodes. The average malicious nodes inside ViTab or cache are reduced. 
Figure 4 introduces 1% churn rate in the simulation. It means that there are 10 out of 1,000 nodes are adding 
and removing at each simulation cycle. We show the security vulnerability of gossip protocols after 
protecting with the proposed mechanism from figure 5. The simulation did on 5,000 nodes with 0.4% 
malicious nodes and 10,000 with 0.2%. It shows few malicious nodes have performed same effect on long 
run. Hence, we cannot ignore tiny quantity of malicious nodes inside such overlay. The initial effects of 
malicious nodes on the overlay are depicted in figure 6. The figure shows hype at boot time, since the nodes 
are isolated due to no connectivity among them. Each node connects at cycle-1 after gossip; hence no cluster 
occurs at this point of gossip. The effect of malicious nodes is shown from cycle-2. Due to proposed secure 
mechanism, the formation of clusters are reduced and come down near zero very soon. More malicious nodes 
are formed more clusters initially and take few more cycles to handle them. 
 
 
fig: 3 
 
 
 
 
fig: 4 
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Fig. 5 
 
 
Fig. 6 
 
5   Conclusion 
 
Gossip-based protocols are a state of the art technique for the crucial unstructured P2P overlay connectivity. 
Secure healthy connectivity is an important issue in such P2P networks. We have pointed out the security 
vulnerability of such over-lays. We have modified the mechanism by applying probabilistic gossip model. 
The proposed scheme is proved to be more secure than other existing protocols through Simulation. 
 
 
References 
 
1. I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Liben-Nowell, D. R. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek, F. Dabek, and H. Balakrishnan : 
Chord- A Scalable Peer-to-Peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications. IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Networking, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 17-32, (2003). 
2. A. Demers, D. Greene, C. Hauser, W. Irish, J. Larson, S. Shenker, H. Sturgis, D. Swinehart, and D. Terry: 
Epidemic algorithms for replicated database maintenance. in Proc. of the 6th ACM Symposium on Principles 
of Distributing Computing (PODC87), pp. 1-12, (1987). 
3. P. T. Eugster, R. Guerraoui, A.-M. Kermarrec, and L. Massouli: Epidemic information dissemination in 
distributed systems. IEEE Computer, vol. 37, no. 5, pp.60-67, (2004). 
4. A. Rowstron and P. Druschel: Pastry- Scalable, decentralized object location and routing for large-scale 
peer-to-peer systems. in Proc. of IFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems Platforms 
(Middleware), pp. 329-350, (2001). 
5. S. Rhea, D. Geels, T. Roscoe, and J. Kubiatowicz: Handling churn in a DHT. In Proc. of the USENIX 
Annual Technical Conference. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, pp. 10-23, (2004). 
6. M. Jelasity, A. Montresor, and O. Babaoglu: A modular paradigm for building self-organizing peer- to-
peer applications. in Proc. of Engineering Self- Organising Systems. Springer, pp. 265-282, (2004). 
602   Anubhava Srivastava and Parvez Ahmad /  Procedia Computer Science  78 ( 2016 )  595 – 602 
7. Mark Jelasity, Alberto Montresor, and Ozalp Babaoglu: The bootstrapping service. in Proc. Of the 26th 
IEEE International Conference Workshops on Distributed Computing Systems (IDCSW06).IEEE Computer 
Society, pp. 11-16, (2006). 
8. S. Voulgaris and M. van Steen,: Epidemic-style management of semantic overlays for content-based 
searching. in Proc. of Euro-Par 2005 Parallel Processing, pp. 1143- 1152, (2005). 
9. S. Voulgaris, D. Gavidia, and M. van Steen: Cyclon- Inexpensive membership man- agement for 
unstructured P2P overlays. Journal of Network and Systems Manage- ment, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 197-217, 
(2005). 
10. Marin Bertier, Francois Bonnet, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Vincent Leroy, Sathya Peri, Michel Raynal : 
D2HT- The Best of Both Worlds, Integrating RPS and DHT. European Dependable Computing Conference, 
pp. 135{144, (2010). 
11. G. P. Jesi, A. Montresor and M. van Steen: A Secure Peer Sampling., Elsevier Journal, 54, pp. 2086-
2098, (2010). 
12. G. P. Jesi, D. Hales, and M. van Steen: Identifying Malicious Peers Before its TooLate: A Decentralized 
Secure Peer Sampling Service. IEEE SASO, Boston, MA(USA), (2007). 
13. Sumit Kumar Tetarave, SomanathTripathy, SathyaPeri. S-Gossip: Security En- hanced Gossip Protocol 
for Unstructured P2P Networks, 11th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Internet 
Technology, Springer , Volume 8956, pp 288-298, (2015).  
14. Anceaume, Emmanuelle and Busnel, Yann and Gambs, Sebastien: Uniform and Ergodic Sampling in 
Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems with Malicious Nodes. Springer,ISBN: 978-3-642-17652-4, Tozeur, 
Tunisie, (2010). 
15. Bortnikov, Edward and Gurevich, Maxim and Keidar, Idit and Kliot, Gabriel and Shraer, Alexander: 
Brahms: byzantine resilient random membership sampling. Pro- ceedings of the twenty-seventh ACM 
symposium on Principles of distributed computing, Toronto, Canada, (2008). 
16. A. Montresor and M. Jelasity: PeerSim: A scalable P2P simulator., IEEE Ninth International Conference, 
pp. 99-100 (2009). 
